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Abstract
The European Union and national minorities have an uneasy relationship. The EU
claims to make life better for all of us in all sorts of ways. It does not, however,
want to engage very much with national minorities. This is puzzling, as the respect
of minority rights has found its way into article 2 of the Treaty on European
Union, which lists the common values upon which the Union is founded. It is
furthermore puzzling, as the EU member states in other fora have recognized the
vulnerability of minorities and the necessity of their special protection. On the
other hand, the EU might be the wrong one to blame. EU institutions are limited in
their competences to act when it comes to areas of importance to minorities. In
addition, minorities are protected through other organizations. It is argued that it is
unlikely that the EU will become a serious minority actor playing out its strength
as a supranational actor, and therewith create a truly coherent minority rights
regime with the OSCE and the Council of Europe.
Keywords: European Union, minority rights, Lisbon treaty, competences, European minority
regime
‘The EU tries to make life better for all of us in all sorts of ways.’ This is the opening
sentence in the EU’s Kids’ corner – the EU website for children (‘EU’s Kids Corner’, 2016).
It is certainly true that the EU involves itself in almost all aspects of everyday life of its 500
million citizens. It may also be true that the EU aspires to improve the life of all of us living
in the European Union. However, is it prepared to work in all sorts of ways? And is it
prepared to address specific issues of vulnerable groups such as minorities? The answers to
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those two questions can at best be a hesitant yes, as the EU certainly has not proven to be a
friend of minorities. Of course, generalizations are dangerous.
The EU is one of three international organizations in Europe that work with and on
human rights: the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the European Union. The EU no doubt
has the weakest link with minorities. It is not surprising that minorities crave the attention of
the last missing big player in Europe. It even makes sense. The European Union is far more
involved in all aspects of every-day life than the Council of Europe and the OSCE. If the EU
were to take minorities seriously, what might be possible?
On the other hand, it is too easy to blame the EU for everything. The two EU treaties
set the limits for the EU’s competences. The flaw in the European minority regime, at least
from a minority viewpoint perceived, is largely legally determined. Transforming the EU into
a serious minority actor is a huge challenge where battles will have to be fought in many
different places. At the same time, the OSCE and the Council of Europe already provide
protection. The EU certainly can do more for minorities than it does at the moment – it does
not work ‘in all sorts of ways’ for improving the everyday life of members of minorities.
However, high expectations are met by legal limits.
The first chapter of the contribution opens with an overview of the status quo. Chapter
two presents reasons in favour of increasing the EU’s commitment to minority issues and
reasons against such increased commitment. On the basis of these reasons, the third chapter
discusses the possibilities and challenges of an increased commitment. Finally, the EU and its
non-commitment are set in the larger European context. It is argued that it is unlikely that the
EU will become a serious minority actor, and therewith create a coherent minority rights
regime with the OSCE and the Council of Europe. This, however, is not necessarily a flaw of
the European system for the protection of minorities.
1. Status quo of the EU as a minority actor
The Lisbon Treaty was a step forward for minorities; or so it seemed. Minorities are now
mentioned in the new article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The Charter of
Fundamental Rights (CFR) includes minorities in art. 21 on non-discrimination. Art. 6 (1)
TEU now confers on the Charter ‘the same legal value as the Treaties.’ In other words, the
Charter is now legally binding on the member states and even more importantly on the EU
institutions. Furthermore, new art. 6 (2) TEU paves the way for the EU to accede to the
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European Convention on Human Rights (Defeis, 2010; McDermott, 2009-2010; Douglas-
Scott, 2011). The accession is still in progress. On paper, these changes wield a number of
opportunities and seem to indicate that minorities have finally been accepted within the EU
regime. So far, these changes have been hardly felt at all (Barten, 2015).
In order to understand and evaluate the EU as a minority actor (Hummer, 2011), it is
important to be aware of the legal limits. Granted, the legal limits are set by political actors
and can thus be changed. However, conventional wisdom tells us that the EU itself is
unwilling to engage. This is, of course, a blatant generalization. The EU is made up of many
institutions and the Commission, Parliament and Council should not be confused. They have
distinct approaches and most importantly different possibilities and competences.
If the legal boundaries prohibit the EU from entering more substantially into minority
issues, one needs to call on the state actors to change the treaties. It will not change anything
to blame, for example, the Commission if it only follows the rules. If, however, the rules
allow for further engagement than is shown, then the EU actually is the right addressee of
minority frustration.
1.1 Institutions
The European Commission is at the heart of the European Union. It is staffed by persons
working for the EU and art. 17 TEU makes it abundantly clear that Commissioners are
independent and work in the interest of the European Union. The Commission is the
institution concerned with citizens’ initiatives and therefore of special relevance. Art. 17 TEU
specifies that the Commission promotes the general interests of the Union and takes
appropriate initiatives to this end: ‘It ensures the application of the Treaties, and of measures
adopted by the institutions pursuant to them.’ The Commission is thus a key actor when it
comes to whether minorities could or should play a more prominent role in the European
Union.
The European Parliament’s powers have been massively expanded over the years;
however, the parliament is still the smallest sibling of the three institutions. The parliament
has not been an enemy of minorities; however, it is telling that the current parliament was on
the verge of not establishing the Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities
and Languages (Diedrichsen, 2014). According to art. 14 TEU, the parliament exercises
legislative and budgetary power jointly with the Council.
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The Council of the European Union is the institution that represents state interests. The
Council is also involved in the legislative process. Art. 16 TEU regarding the competences of
the Council mirrors art. 14 TEU on the European Parliament.
The Council and the Parliament have a key role in the legislative process while the
Commission is the heart of the Union. Thus, all three actors are of prime importance for
minorities. An institution such as the Court of Justice of the European Union, of course, is
also relevant as it increasingly deals with human rights issues. However, as it is mainly
involved in a post-potential breach situation and does not create law or take institutional
initiatives, the Court is not central to the discussion of this contribution. Similarly, the
Agency for Fundamental Rights is not a main actor, even though it has the potential to
become a main actor.
1.2 Competences: minority issues and regional issues, culture, education and language
While the three main institutions have different competences regarding the legislative
process, they are all bound by the principle of conferral as laid down in art. 5 TEU.
Competences are conferred to the EU on the basis of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality. As art. 4 TEU states, competences that are not conferred upon the Union in
the treaties remain with the member states. It is thus important to establish which
competences the EU actually has with regards to minority issues and the related issues of
culture, language, education and regional issues.
Regarding the first area, the answer is short and simple. The EU has no express
competences regarding minority issues. Even though the Union may be founded on the
respect of rights of persons belonging to minorities, this is no legal basis for legislative
action. Minorities are not mentioned in any other place in the TEU and TFEU. Art. 21 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights mentions members of national minorities in connection with
non-discrimination.
This is a first sign of possible schizophrenia. The EU claims to be based on the respect
of minority rights; however, it has no competences to protect or further the respect of
minority rights. As is shown below, this is not surprising; and yet, it leaves a sour taste with
members of minorities when the EU in art. 2 TEU speaks of EU values that are common to
the member states but is not given the competences to secure respect for and promote the
fulfilment of minority rights. Is this the EU’s fault? Hardly; or at least not fully. The treaty of
Lisbon, which introduced the respect for minority rights into the TEU, was negotiated by the
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EU member states. Similarly, the conferral of competences was agreed upon by the member
states that had to sign and ratify the Lisbon treaty. In this particular context, the EU is no
more than the sum of its members. It would thus not do justice to accuse the EU as such of
empty promises. If promises were indeed made, they were made by the member states.
If minorities want the European Union, or more precisely its institutions, to become
active in minority protection, they need to take detours over the areas that are of importance
to minorities. Traditionally, these are culture, language and education. Participation in
political affairs is in EU terms covered by economic, social and territorial cohesion.
There are different categories of competences in the TFEU. According to art. 2 (1)
TFEU, in areas where the Union has exclusive competence, only the EU may legislate and
adopt legally binding acts. Art. 3 TFEU lists the areas where the EU has exclusive
competence. Neither culture, language, education nor regional issues are among them. The
most common category of competences is the one of shared competences. According to art. 2
(2) TFEU, both the EU and the member states may adopt legislation and legally binding acts.
Primacy is given to the Union, stating that ‘member states shall exercise their competence to
the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence’ and that member states ‘shall
again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising
its competence.’ According to art 4 (2), the areas covered by shared competences include the
area of economic, social and territorial cohesion.
Articles 174-178 TFEU address this area. They address issues of economic
development in ‘least favoured regions’ (Art. 174 (2) TEU). Development is supported
through five structural funds (for an overview, see Structural and Investment Funds, 2016).
While minorities can benefit from these initiatives if they live in poorer or underdeveloped
regions, they are by no means the target groups. The rationale behind cohesion policy is
economic development and not a humanistic approach to improve the lives of people.
A better chance of improving participation of minorities might be through membership
in the Committee of the Regions. The committee is composed of 350 elected representatives
in regional or local authorities from all EU member states. The aim is to ‘give regions and
cities a formal say in EU law-making ensuring that the position and needs of regional and
local authorities are respected’ (Committee of the Regions, 2016). The first obvious
weakness of the Committee is, of course, its lack of competence when it comes to binding
decisions. The competences of the Committee are laid down in art. 307 TFEU and are namely
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restricted to consultation and submission of opinions. None of the main institutions are bound
by these opinions. The second weakness for minorities is that in order for a member of a
minority to be eligible for membership in the Committee of the Regions, the particular
member has to have been elected into an office at the regional or local level. In areas where
the minority is a numerical majority, this might not pose a problem; however, where the
minority is not politically represented (which can happen for a variety of reasons) at the
regional or local level, members of a minority are precluded from becoming members of the
Committee of the Regions.
In areas where no competence is conferred to the EU, the member states retain
exclusive competence and the EU’s competence to adopt legislation or other legally binding
acts is very limited. Art. 6 TFEU lists areas where the Union is allowed to ‘carry out actions
to support, coordinate or supplement actions of the member states.’ Among these areas are
education and culture.
Art. 165 (4) TFEU lays down the competences of the EU in the area of education. The
EU actually may adopt binding law; however, only ‘incentive measures, excluding any
harmonization of the laws and regulations of member states.’ The Council may adopt
recommendations. Art. 165 (1) explicitly states that the EU in all its actions ‘fully respect[s]
the responsibility of the member states for the content of teaching and the organization of
educations systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.’ The EU may encourage,
promote and develop – however, only as supplements to member state activities.
Art. 167 (1) TFEU on culture shows a similar approach. The EU ‘shall contribute to the
flowering of cultures of the member states.’ The Union shall encourage cooperation. Specific
actions can be taken in the form of ‘incentive measures, excluding any harmonization of laws
and regulations of the member states.’ In addition, the Council may adopt recommendations.
This is a mirror of the competences in the area of culture.
Language does not appear as a separate policy area within the treaties. Art. 3 TEU
speaks of cultural and linguistic diversity; however, art. 3 is not a legal basis for the EU
institutions. Art. 165 TFEU also refers to linguistic diversity; however in the larger context of
education. Furthermore, it is by no means clear that articles 3 and 165 refer to the linguistic
within member states. It rather seems they refer to the linguistic diversity between the
member states (for a more general discussion, see Toggenburg, 2003). They would thus refer
to the official languages in the European Union.
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In conclusion, the member states have not provided the EU with strong competences in
the areas of special relevance for minorities. The institutions are legally limited in their
activities. This, however, does not mean they cannot do anything.
2. An overview of reasons in favour and against more EU commitment
Legal limits need to be taken seriously. However, limits can be moved. As the current limits
are laid down in the EU treaties, any movement of limits would have to be done in the
treaties. Are there good reasons for going down that road? Arguably yes. Are there just as
good reasons for not going down that road? Arguably yes, as well. Below, an overview of
reasons is given before the next chapter looks at the possibilities and challenges if one were
to go down the road of increasing the EU’s commitment with minority issues.
2.1 Reasons in favour of increasing EU commitment to minority issues
Several reasons come to mind that favour a stronger commitment of the EU to minority
issues. Firstly, it seems obvious that the EU should take special care of the 50-75 million
people belonging to minorities within the EU. That is the equivalent of the entire populations
of Denmark, Sweden, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Austria and Slovakia taken together –
add the entire populations of the Netherlands, Finland and Lithuania to reach the upper
estimate of 75 million people.
Most of the EU member states have ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities (Council of Europe, 2016) and thereby confirmed that they recognize
minorities as groups in need of special protection. The UN Declaration on the Rights of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UN General
Assembly, 1992) was not opposed by any (EU member) state. All EU member states are also
members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and agreed to the
Copenhagen Document in 1990 which includes a long section on minority rights
(Copenhagen Document, 1990). It only seems to be the next logical step to let the EU become
a serious actor regarding minority issues.
Another argument could be the extent to which the EU involves itself with the everyday
life of its citizens. Due to its supranational character, it has a further reach than any of the
other organizations. If there is a group with special needs, the EU should surely not only be
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aware of these special needs but also be able to become active in that regard? The EU could
make a difference in the everyday life of members of minorities that face special challenges
because of their membership. If minority protection is a common value for the European
Union, it would only be consistent that the EU was also able to effectively protect minorities
in everyday life.
A third argument takes the larger framework into account. Human rights, and thereby
minority rights, are protected by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and to some degree the
European Union. The EU, however, has only limited competences as shown above. This
leaves a caveat. Providing the EU with competences on minority issues would simply be
filling in the missing piece in a coherent minority protection regime in Europe.
Fourthly and lastly, after having elevated the respect for minority rights to a common
value and after making the Charter of Fundamental Rights with its prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of membership in a national minority, the follow-up is to provide
the EU with competences to act on these expectations, which were raised with the Lisbon
Treaty. A Danish member of the European Parliament, Christel Schaldemose, expressed this
view after the Commission rejected the Minority Safepack (Nygaard, 2013). She went further
and asked the Commission for ‘the real reason’ for rejection, and whether it would reconsider
its refusal and if not, ‘re-evaluate the citizens’ initiative so that in future it can actually be
used for those matters that concern citizens’ (Schaldemose, 2013). The Commission
answered the first question by referring to its letter of refusal (Letter from the Commission,
2013) and did not answer her other questions (European Commission, 2013).
2.2 Reasons against increasing EU commitment to minority issues
While there may be good reasons in favour of providing the EU with special minority
competences, there are also some good reasons against this. For one, the mere fact that there
is a group of 10-15% of the EU population that somehow stands out from the crowd is a
superficial argument. This argument implies that any group that can be singled out among the
five hundred and ten million inhabitants of the European Union and that numbers about 10-
15% of the population is worthy of extra EU protection. This is clearly not the case. The size
of the group is not decisive for protection. 10.2% of all people living in the EU were born
outside the EU (‘People in the EU’, 2015), yet there is no special protection mechanism in
place for them.
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Furthermore, there is a risk of spill-over effect; or rather, spill-over demands. If
minorities can be singled out as a group worthy of extra attention or protection, then other
groups might claim the same attention or protection. Whereas this reason is understandable
from the EU’s point of view, it potentially lacks in substance. Spill-over effects to groups in
need of special protection can hardly be considered a drawback. At the same time, demands
from all sorts of groups, simply because they make up 10-15% of the population, will in most
cases not be constructive. Special measures have to depend on the need for protection, not on
the size of the group.
The second in-favour argument is based on the EU’s involvement in everyday life.
True, EU citizens meet some sort of EU law every single day; mostly without being aware of
it. However, the treaties are very clear that for example culture and education are two areas
where the EU does not play a main role. EU competences are simply limited in these areas. If
the EU’s commitment to minority issues should cover culture and education it would not be
enough to simply establish some sort of minority competence, but the competences in the
areas of culture and education would have to be broadened as well. Minority education or
minority culture cannot be treated separately from majority education and culture.
The last in-favour argument claims that the EU is the missing piece in a coherent
minority protection regime in Europe. It is odd that both the OSCE and the Council of Europe
have identified minorities as needing special protection or playing a crucial role in security
issues and the European Union, which has the furthest outreach of the three organizations,
remains a background player at best. However, to a large degree, this is explained by the
limited competences of the EU. In addition, the fact that the EU will (probably) accede to the
European Convention on Human Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights is legally
binding on EU institutions, moves the EU to the front stage of human rights. In the wake of
this development, members of minorities will have opportunities to claim respect for and
protection of their rights.
After the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered its opinion on EU accession
to the ECHR (CJEU: Opinion 2/13), it is unclear if and when the EU will accede to the
Convention. This is a decisive step for a coherent human rights regime that also strengthens
the rights of persons belonging to minorities. At the moment, the EU is a missing piece;
however, the CFR’s binding nature already changes this to a certain degree. While this means
that the EU becomes a more serious human rights actor, it does not change the fact that the
minority protection regime in Europe is incomplete without the European Union.
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The main argument against providing the EU with far reaching competences on
minority issues seems to be state sovereignty. States have simply not been willing to let the
EU enter the minority arena. National governments exhibit very different approaches towards
their minorities ranging from non-recognition to fruitful integration. Minority issues can be
sensitive issues. There is a reason why the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities
is a security mechanism. It is not surprising that the handling of such sensitive issues is not
left to a supranational organization; let alone conferring competences to the EU that provide
for legally binding decisions on the basis of majority voting.
Of course, equating increased EU commitment with exclusive EU legislative
competence is a serious exaggeration. Increasing the EU’s commitment can take many shapes
as is shown below. It does not necessarily lead to legislative competences and legally binding
decisions. It does not necessarily mean that a new policy area on minority issues is introduced
into the TFEU. This is all up to the member states.
Which reasons – those in favour or those against increased commitment – weigh
heavier is a matter of personal conviction. For the purpose of this contribution, it is now
necessary to look at the possibilities and challenges of increased commitment.
3. Possibilities and challenges of increasing the EU’s commitment
Increasing the EU’s commitment to minority issues can take many forms and faces many
challenges. Whereas the possibilities will first be discussed, the challenges make up the
second part of this chapter.
3.1 Possibilities
The possibilities suggested here by no means make up an exhaustive list of possibilities. The
suggestions fall mainly into two categories: institutions and material competences. Any new
institution must, of course, also be endowed with a mandate; however, the material
competences referred to here mean the competences in certain policy areas as laid down in
the treaties and independent of specific institutions.
In the context of institutions, minority rights could be addressed in various ways. One
possibility could be the establishment of a Commissioner for Minority Rights or a
Commissioner on Human Rights including minority rights. Human rights are spread out in
the portfolios of several commissioners.1 There is no word on minorities. Bundling at least
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the broader area of human rights issues with one commissioner would lead to putting focus
on human rights and minority rights. The mandate of the commissioner could include
mainstreaming minority protection.
A second possibility is the establishment of a Committee of Minorities which is
modelled on the Committee of the Regions. The Committee would be involved in areas of
minority concern. Regarding its competences, it would submit opinions and be consulted by
the main institutions. Of course, a larger role would be desirable from a minority point of
view; however, the question is – which is also addressed in more detail below – what is
feasible considering a general member state reluctance to let the EU deal with minority issues
at all.
An idea taken from the UN human rights regime is the establishment of a Special
Rapporteur. The mandate of special rapporteurs typically includes country visits and the
possibility to interact with civil society; in this case obviously with minorities. Special
rapporteurs are no ombudsmen and they do not make legally binding decisions. They raise
awareness, shed light on situations and challenges and make recommendations (de Schutter,
2014: 973-980). A special rapporteur is an intergovernmental institution. The special
rapporteur could, like a Committee of Minorities, be involved in the work of the main
institutions on a consultative basis.
The Fundamental Rights Agency could be made a more substantial player in the
minority arena. This would mean setting new priorities for the Agency. The Agency could
serve as a sort of watch dog on EU legislation with a special focus on effects for minorities.
The Commission, of course, is already obliged to ensure that all EU legislation is in
conformity with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and thus does not discriminate against
members of national minorities. The mandate of the Agency could be slightly different in the
sense, that the Charter would only form part of the work. By watching over EU legislation, a
mainstreaming of minority protection would ideally be achieved.
In regards to material competences, there is always a possibility to broaden
competences during treaty revisions. Either a new policy area could be introduced or the
competences in those areas of special minority concern could be broadened. Apart from the
fact, though, that no general treaty revision is in sight at the moment, general state reluctance
and sovereignty issues makes this a less than likely possibility.
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A third category of possibilities is that of the proposals in the minority citizens’
initiative Minority Safepack (FUEN, 2016). The initiative includes eleven specific initiatives
that strengthen minority protection in various ways. The problem with these eleven initiatives
is that some or all have been deemed by the Commission to fall outside its scope of
competences (Letter from the Commission, 2013). Unfortunately, the Commission failed to
clarify which initiatives might fall within the scope of its competences. The decision by the
Commission has been challenged before the Court of Justice of the European Union (case T-
646/13); however, no decision has been made yet by the court. Thus, it is as of today unclear
which initiatives, if any, fall within the competences of the Commission. If the Commission
indeed has competences that it does not make use of, then the Minority Safepack Initiative
offers new possibilities that may require new institutions, but no broadening of material
competences.
It goes beyond the scope of this contribution to assess each of the eleven initiatives in
terms of the scope of competence of the Commission. Therefore, only a few are mentioned
here. The first initiative aims at a council recommendation as referred to in articles 165 and
167 TFEU – also referred to above in the context of education and culture. The
recommendation is meant to aim at the protection and promotion of cultural and linguistic
diversity in the Union (initiative 2.1). An institutional initiative, also on the basis of articles
165 and 167 TFEU, concerns the setting up of language diversity centres (initiative 2.3).
Adjusting regional funds to promote pluralism in regions with minorities (initiative 3.2) is
based on articles 173 (3) and 182 (1) TFEU and addresses the issue of minority participation.
Similarly, initiative 2.2, based on articles 165 and 167 TFEU, aims at adjusting funding
programmes to make them accessible for smaller language communities. All of these
initiatives have in common that they seem – pending a thorough analysis – to fall within the
scope of competence of the Commission. None of them aims at harmonization of national
laws, and they are supportive and supplementary to existing instruments. They could be
implemented without treaty revision.
3.2 Challenges
Possibilities are usually countered by challenges. It was already stated above, that the main
challenge for increasing the EU’s commitment to minority issues is a general member state
reluctance to provide the EU with the necessary competences. This is not only the case with
explicit minority issues, but also with areas such as education and culture, which are of
special importance to minorities.
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A revision of the treaties is not on the agenda and even if that were to take place soon,
that would not guarantee the good will of EU member states towards minorities. Establishing
new institutions that work at the intergovernmental level and not supranationally might have
a better chance than broadening material competences. However, again there are no signs that
indicate that the EU itself or the member states would have an interest in establishing a
special rapporteur or a Committee of Minorities.
In short, the political will of member states is lacking. How far the limited competences
can justify the reluctance of the Commission remains to be seen, when the Court of Justice
makes a decision in the Minority Safepack case. One should also bear in mind, that even if
the Court should find against the Commission, this does not in any way mean that any of the
initiatives falling within the Commission’s competences will become reality.
Even if good will towards minorities were to be found, it will be important to cooperate
closely with the OSCE and the Council of Europe. Being the then no longer missing piece
means filling a hole and both regarding the OSCE and the Council of Europe, duplication of
their work should be avoided. Instead cooperation is envisaged. The EU and the Council of
Europe have signed a Memorandum of Understanding, which speaks of an enhanced
partnership (Memorandum of Understanding, 2007).
Even if goodwill were to be found, minorities would bring a number of challenges with
them. The spill-over demands were already mentioned above and would have to be dealt
with. The fact that there exists no legally binding definition of what constitutes a minority
might become a problem. At the moment, states themselves decide which minorities they
recognize and protect under different mechanisms. This is in stark contrast to the first OSCE
High Commissioner Max van der Stoel’s statement, that minorities are a matter of fact, not of
definition (van der Stoel, 1993). Furthermore, when engaging with minorities, how is it
determined who rightly represents a minority? Minorities come in various characters
(linguistic, religious etc.), sizes and geographical spreading. The lack of a binding definition
shows how difficult it is to find a description which fits so many different groups.
3.3 Intermediate conclusion
There are ample possibilities of improving minority protection within the European Union.
Probably, the EU has competences which are of use to minorities which it does not make use
of at the moment or which the minorities are not aware are useful for them (Ahmed, 2011).
Almost any initiative faces the challenge of lack of member state interest. Be it for security
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reasons, because of sovereignty issues, for competence issues or for other reasons, minorities
seem to meet a wall of resistance when it comes to the EU.
4. The European context
In order to assess whether the European Union really is of such vital importance to
minorities, the larger European context has to be taken into consideration. Minorities are
protected by the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the
European Charter for Regional or Minority Language – of course, only in the states party to
the treaties. The OSCE has established a security mechanism with the High Commissioner on
National Minorities; the HCNM. The question now is, whether the EU actually is the missing
piece.
4.1 The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe is characterized by an intergovernmental approach based on
international law. The two main protection mechanisms for minorities are provided by the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter
for Regional or Minority Languages. Implementation is in both cases supervised through a
monitoring system. Individuals have no possibility of claiming breaches under either treaty.
The monitoring cycles end with recommendations.
The Framework Convention often uses broad or vague formulations. This leaves space
for the states to fill the framework of minority protection according to their own national
situations. The Convention covers all of the most important areas for minorities: existence,
identity, language, culture, education, participation and cross-frontier contacts. The Advisory
Committee of the Framework Convention has been able to establish itself as a heavy weight
in the minority protection regime in Europe.
The Language Charter focuses only on language. However, the Charter is extremely
detailed and offers a so-called menu of rights. A certain number of rights in prescribed
sections must be chosen; however, the parties to the Charter again have the possibility to
apply the Charter to their own situation. As was noted above, minorities come in all forms,
sizes and territorial spreading. Effective protection is always tailored to a specific minority.
Thus, a certain degree of flexibility ensures a better application of protective measures.
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4.2 The OSCE
The OSCE is characterized by a political approach. There is no treaty under international law.
Even the founding documents – the Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris for a New
Europe are not treaties under international law. Decisions are taken by consensus. The OSCE
relies solely on diplomacy, political pressure and political goodwill.
Despite the absence of judicial mechanisms, the OSCE is able to effectively work for
security and promote cooperation in Europe. In the field of minorities, the High
Commissioner on National Minorities is most noteworthy. A conflict prevention tool, the
HCNM works quietly and aims at solving issues before serious conflicts break out. The
HCNM does not take sides when problems arise between a government and a minority.
However, the security approach is characterized by the belief, that well treated minorities
pose no threat to the peace and security of a state. This should not be understood to grant
each minority each and every single wish. It is a mere general approach that believes that
persecution and oppression of minorities easily can lead to breaches of peace and security in
a state (CSCE Helsinki, 1992: ch. II). The OSCE serves as a forum for negotiations,
confidence building and generally keeps in the background.
4.3 The European Union: The missing piece?
Both the OSCE and the Council of Europe interact with the government of states. For twenty-
eight of the member states of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, there are other
institutions that have a profound impact on national legislation: the EU institutions. Until
2009, the EU institutions were outside the scope of any human rights obligations, not even
speaking about minority rights. In 2001, the Charter of Fundamental Rights slowly
introduced the EU institutions to human rights obligations. However, it is only since 2009
that the institutions also are legally bound by the Charter. This change of the Charter’s legal
status marked a profound turning point in the European human rights regime. Now, all actors
that make legally binding law must meet human rights standards. These standards stem from
different sources such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on
Human Rights. They may vary slightly and some rights, such as the right to data protection in
the CFR, are only found in source. Nevertheless, the fact that EU institutions now have
legally binding human rights obligations means that the EU is no longer completely missing
in the European context. The EU will further strengthen its commitments when it accedes to
the European Convention of Human Rights.
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Furthermore, the three organizations already cooperate. Already the Treaty on the
European Coal and Steel Community included provisions on close cooperation, and
cooperation has existed ever since (Vandenberghe, 2008/2009: 8-31).
The fact that the European Union is no longer missing and will even come to the fore
once accession has taken place bodes well for human rights and members of minorities, who,
of course, also enjoy general human rights. Neither the change of legality of the CFR nor EU
accession to the ECHR, however, cause the EU to fill the hole in the minority rights regime
in Europe. Members of minorities certainly benefit from better human rights protection;
however, their special needs of protection are left unconsidered in the general human rights
context.
Based on this assessment, even with the changes of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European
Union remains the missing peace in a coherent minority rights regime in Europe. The
tentative steps towards minority protection were not supported by competences in the treaties.
A follow-up is thus just as necessary as it is unlikely at the moment. None of the initiatives
introduced in chapter 3 stand a good chance of being implemented. The EU will thus remain
a severed minority rights actor. Art. 2 TEU and the prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of membership in national minorities together with the general strengthening of human rights
provides for a good basis – however, minorities cannot expect much protection from these
changes in their everyday life as members of minorities.
At the same time, though, minorities are actually protected via other mechanisms. The
European Union may thus be the missing piece; however, the hole it has to fill is not as large
as it once was. Considering the limited competences of the EU in areas of relevance to
minorities, there are limitations to what the EU could fill the hole with.
The Federal Union of European Nationalities lends support to the citizens’ initiative
Minority Safepack whose very aim is to engage the EU more with minority issues and the
initiative includes specific proposals. The implementation of the Minority Safepack could fill
the hole to a certain degree. However, when considering the competences and ways of
working of the three organizations, the one thing that separates the EU from the OSCE and
the Council of Europe is its supranational character. The hole in a coherent minority regime
in Europe is not likely to be filled with supranational competences for the European Union.
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Yes, coherence will be improved if the EU were to implement the suggestions of
chapter three. However, it wouldn’t draw on the strength of the European Union; its
supranationality.
5. Non-commitment as a merit or a flaw
Whether one considers the relative non-commitment to be a merit or a flaw depends very
much on one’s own starting point and cannot be answered objectively. In chapter 2, reasons
in favour of and against stronger commitment were presented. Obviously, being in favour of
increased commitment is based on seeing the non-commitment as a flaw. Being against
increased commitment, however, does not necessarily correspond with seeing the non-
commitment as a merit. More commitment might actually be desired; just not under the
current conditions.
Non-commitment of the EU, being the limited actor it is at the moment, may actually
be a good thing for minorities. This, however, should not be confused with an acceptance of
the status quo but could equally signify a wish for a profound change of the EU in order to
transform the EU into a serious minority actor – as realistic or unrealistic as this may be.
The fact that the European actor with the furthest reaching competences does not
engage with minorities is puzzling from a minority point of view. However, from a variety of
other viewpoints, this is actually comprehensible. The EU is only gradually evolving into a
political and human rights actor. Granted, more promises have been indicated than have been
acted upon; however, the European Union is not a human rights organization. Furthermore,
the EU does not aim at special group protection. There is no reason why the EU would start
singling out minorities and awarding them with special protection mechanisms. Lastly, the
member states themselves have not been willing to provide the EU with strong competences
in the areas of special relevance to minorities. In other words, the EU is legally limited to act.
In conclusion, puzzlement at non-commitment is misplaced.
A real change for minority protection in Europe would mean an extension of
competences within the European Union. This presupposes the good will of states and a
treaty revision process; none of which is anywhere in sight. To make real changes and
introduce the EU as a minority actor, minorities have very a long way to go and hard work to
do. Only if they persuade their governments will they stand a chance of changing
competences.
121
Until this happens, the EU is not really a missing piece in the European minority rights
regime. What the EU could offer is very little with the limited competences. A special
rapporteur, a Committee of Minorities or a different focus for the Agency of Fundamental
Rights may all contribute to putting a focus on minorities and mainstreaming minority rights.
The EU is already on its way to strengthening human rights. The missing piece becomes
smaller and smaller. However, the important characteristics of the EU compared to the OSCE
and the Council of Europe is its supra-nationality. The supra-national competences of the EU,
however, are unlikely to reach minorities anytime soon.
Notes
1. The Commissioner on Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality is, amongst other things, responsible for the
finalization of the EU accession to the ECHR and that all Commission proposals respect the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. The responsibilities of the Commissioner on Education, Culture, Youth and Sport
include ‘empowering young people of all social and cultural backgrounds so that they can participate fully in
civic and democratic life.’ This could be of relevance for young members of minorities; however, at the same
time, there is no indication that they are the target of this responsibility. The Commissioner on Migration,
Home Affairs and Citizenship has the somewhat vaguely formulated responsibility of “strengthening
citizens’ rights provided for in the EU treaties”. For the tasks see respectively the mission letters from Jean-
Claude Juncker from 1 November 2014.
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